By John Barresi, Raymond Martin
Naturalization of the Soul charts the advance of the concept that of soul in western inspiration, from Plato to the current. The authors position specific emphasis at the eighteenth century which witnessed an important highbrow transformation within the means theorists perceived self and private identification and cleared the path for modern philosophical and mental debates.
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Extra info for Naturalization of the Soul: Self and Personal Identity in the Eighteenth Century (Routledge Studies in Eighteenth Century Philosophy)
26; 347). There is an obvious problem with this answer. In so far as reward and punishment is accorded to a person only for what the person does, and God on the day of judgment arranges it so that a person is conscious of everything he does, then there must be some standard by which God determines what a person has done other than that of what the person is conscious of having done. Many commentators think that here also Locke lapses into irretrievable incoherence. However, Locke may here simply be betraying the fact that except for a benign skepticism, he is indifferent to mundane metaphysics.
It is more plausible to suppose that what Collins had in mind is that the injustice would result simply from God’s bringing about a pain twenty times greater than was merited. , emphasis added). In sum, Clarke provided genuine fission examples. Ironically, he also had a view of the self according to which genuine fission is impossible. So, he 37 NATURALIZATION OF THE SOUL perceived the seeming possibility of genuine fission as an absurdity following from relational accounts of identity. Also ironically, Collins, who had a view of personal identity that allowed him to acknowledge fission as a real possibility, may not have fully followed Clarke’s examples.
23;344). , not co-conscious). In Locke’s view, the day-person and night-person, in spite of their sharing the same body, are different people. In the second example, one consciousness is in two bodies. Locke’s use of the expression, ‘acting by intervals’ suggests that he meant that the consciousness was first in one body and then in the other, but never in both at the same time. If this is what he meant, then neither of these examples is a genuine fission example since neither involves (i) one consciousness dividing into two, each of which is then (ii) continuous with the original, (iii) contemporaneous with the other, and yet (iv) independent of the other.