By Scott E. Harrington
This learn outlines the compelling case for frequent deregulation of property-liability coverage premiums and types.
Read Online or Download Insurance Deregulation and the Public Interest PDF
Similar insurance books
Dedicated to the matter of becoming parametric chance distributions to facts, this remedy uniquely unifies loss modeling in a single booklet. info units used are relating to the assurance undefined, yet will be utilized to different distributions. Emphasis is at the distribution of unmarried losses relating to claims made opposed to numerous sorts of policies.
Strategic Planning and Modeling in Property-Liability Insurance
The Geneva organization and chance Economics The Geneva organization The Geneva organization (International organization for the learn of assurance Economics) began its actions in June 1973, at the initiative of 22 participants in 8 ecu nations. It now has fifty-four participants in 16 nations in Europe and within the usa.
Die Prinzipien der Lebensversicherungstechnik: Erster Teil Die Versicherung der Normalen Risiken
§ 1. Versicherungsbetrieb und Versicherungstechnik. - § 2. Das Schema der Gewinn- und Verlustrechnung. - § three. Der Einfluß der Rechnungsgrundlagen. - § four. Überschuß- und Rücklagenbildung. - I. Grundlegendes aus der Versicherungsmathematik. - § five. Sterblichkeit und Zins. - § 6. Die Berechnung der Prämien und Rücklagen.
- Health Care
- Insurance Statistics Yearbook Annuaire des statistiques d’assurance 1999-2008
- Annals of Life Insurance Medicine: 1964 Volume II
Extra resources for Insurance Deregulation and the Public Interest
Sample text
The Role of Collective Pricing in Auto Insurance. : Federal Trade Commission, Bureau of Economics. Epstein, Richard A. 1999. ” George Mason University Law Review 7: 293–311. , and Robert W. Klein. 1998. ” Center for Risk Management and Insurance Research, Georgia State University. Grabowski, Henry, W. Kip Viscusi, and William N. Evans. 1989. ” Journal of Risk and Insurance 56: 275–99. , and Michael M. Barth. 1993. ” Working paper. Financial Sector Development Division, World Bank. Gron, Anne. 1993.
See MacAvoy (1977), Danzon (1983), Eisenach (1985), Joskow and McLaughlin (1991), and Macey and Miller (1993) for additional discussions. 25. See, for example, Plummer (1985). 26. For general discussion of that issue, see Breyer (1982, 161–64). 27. See Keeton and Kwerel (1984) for a theoretical model of efficient subsidies in auto liability insurance. See also Smith and Wright (1992) and Jaffee and Russell (1995). Harrington (1994) critiques economic rationales for compulsory auto insurance. 28.
Federal Trade Commission, Bureau of Economics. Epstein, Richard A. 1999. ” George Mason University Law Review 7: 293–311. , and Robert W. Klein. 1998. ” Center for Risk Management and Insurance Research, Georgia State University. Grabowski, Henry, W. Kip Viscusi, and William N. Evans. 1989. ” Journal of Risk and Insurance 56: 275–99. , and Michael M. Barth. 1993. ” Working paper. Financial Sector Development Division, World Bank. Gron, Anne. 1993. ” Working paper. University of Chicago Graduate School of Business.