By Antony Duff
This long-awaited booklet, through the prestigious thinker Antony Duff, bargains a brand new viewpoint at the constructions of legal legislation and legal legal responsibility. The book's start line is a contrast among accountability (understood as answerability) and legal responsibility, and a belief of accountability as relational and practice-based. This specialize in accountability, as an issue of being answerable to people who have the status to name one to account, throws new mild on a number of questions in legal legislations concept: at the query of criminalization, that can now be solid because the query of what we should always need to solution for, and to whom, lower than the specter of legal conviction and punishment; on questions on the legal trial, as a method by which defendants are referred to as to respond to, and concerning the stipulations (bars to trial) given which a tribulation will be illegitimate; on questions on the constitution of offenses, the excellence among offenses and defenses, and the phenomena of strict legal responsibility and strict accountability; and on questions about the buildings of legal defenses. the internet result's now not a conception of legal legislation, however it is an account of the constitution of legal legislations as an establishment in which a liberal polity defines a realm of public wrongdoing, and calls to account those that perpetrate (or are accused of perpetrating) such wrongs. Answering for Crime can be crucial studying for felony legislations theorists.
Read or Download Answering for Crime: Responsibility and Liability in the Criminal Law (Legal Theory Today) PDF
Similar criminal law books
During this up to date re-creation, Rothman chronicles and examines incarceration of the felony, the deviant, and the established in U. S. society, with a spotlight on how and why those equipment have continued and multiplied for over a century and a part, regardless of longstanding facts in their disasters and abuses.
Traditionally, the statement and invocation of legal consequences have been public spectacles. this day, worry of crime and disaffection with the felony justice method make sure that this public fascination with punishment keeps. long ago decade, almost each legislature within the nation has undertaken sentencing reform, within the wish that public challenge with crime will be allayed and dispari ties in legal sentences will be decreased if now not eradicated.
Inner most legislations governs our such a lot pervasive relationships with other folks: the wrongs we do to each other, the valuables we personal and exclude from others' use, the contracts we make and holiday, and the advantages discovered at another's fee that we can't justly hold. the foremost principles of non-public legislations are popular, yet how they're equipped, defined, and justified is an issue of fierce debate via attorneys, economists, and philosophers.
Extra info for Answering for Crime: Responsibility and Liability in the Criminal Law (Legal Theory Today)
48 See eg the detention provisions of s 23 of the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001, which the House of Lords declared to be incompatible with the right to liberty declared in Art 5(1) of the European Convention on Human Rights in A v Secretary of State for the Home Department  HRLR 1; those provisions have now been repealed by the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005, which provides for a range of ‘control orders’ instead. See generally Zedner, 2003, 2005. 49 For the principled rationale for this see Duff, 1986: 172–8.
Such ideas can be explained in terms of relational responsibility. 15 The ‘to S’ and ‘as Φ’ dimensions require a little further explanation, in part to make clear how the objects and directions of responsibility can differ from one context to another: how I can be responsible as Φ for X, but not for Y (though 12 Compare Hart, 1968a: 212–14; Lucas, 1993; Watson, 2001; contrast Tadros, 2005a: 24–31. 1 below, on responsibility as a matter of reasons-responsiveness. 14 See further sect 3 below, on prospective responsibility.
This is not simply an ad hoc attempt to preserve the relational character of responsibility, while making it less interesting, by positing oneself as the person to whom one is always answerable. For, first, responsibility to ourselves plays a substantive role in our lives: to take oneself and one’s agency seriously is, in part, to hold oneself responsible for how one lives. Secondly, we must still ask who else (if anyone) has the standing to hold us responsible for different aspects of our lives; we must still explain what it is to be responsible for X partly by specifying to whom we are responsible for X.